IEI
T h i s c a l c u l a t i o n a l note documents t h e c a l c u l a t i o n o f absorbed doses expected f o r a p o s t u l a t e d accident d u r i n g shipment o f Plutonium Recycle Test Reactor (PRTR) r u p t u r e l o o p i o n exchange columns per I n t e r n a l Memo 8M730-HJG-96-007 (Reference 1).
Methodology The methodology o f performing these c a l c u l a t i o n s i n support o f t h e r a d i o l o g i c a l dose s e c t i o n o f an SARP i s s e t f o r t h i n Reference 3. I t i s based on t h e Q-system o u t l i n e d i n Reference 4, o r i g i n a l l y developed f o r c a l c u l a t i o n o f A,/A, values used i n t h e d e t e r m i n a t i o n o f packaging requirements. Reference 3 and t h i s a n a l y s i s use t h i s methodology t o determine dose, g i v e n an a c t i v i t y , r a t h e r than determining an a c t i v i t y , g i v e n a dose l i m i t . Assumptions
The f o l l o w i n g i s w r i t t e n t o f a c i l i t a t e i n c l u s i o n i n t o t h e SARP.
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CONTENTS EVALUATION

. 1 CHARACTERIZATION
Reactor (PRTR) r u p t u r e l o o p w i l l be placed i n t h r e e 12.23 m3 metal boxes ( 6 ' x 6 '~1 2 ' ) . These columns have been designated as a non-dangerous waste i n accordance w i t h t h e Washington S t a t e Dangerous Waste Regulations (Ch 173-303, Washington A d m i n i s t r a t i v e Code). Two o f t h e boxes (Boxes 1 & 2) have been c l a s s i f i e d as category t h r e e and one (Box 3 ) w i l l be category one. The v o i d space e x i s t i n g a f t e r t h e I X columns are loaded i n t o t h e boxes w i l l be f i l l e d w i t h g r o u t . 
2.22e-02
2.22e-02
4.53e-01 4.53e-01
6.37e-06 6.37e-06
7.69e-01 0.00e+00 0.00e+00 0.00e+00 7.69e-01
The f o l l o w i n g source term has been supplied by t h e customer (Reference 1 2 ) . Table 1 Box 1 ( f X Columns L3, t l , R1, and R Z ) ( C i )
T o t a l 5.54et00 9.79e-03 2.29e-02 1.06e+00 6.63e+00 1 1 13' Cs I 2.10et00 I 4.30e-03 I ].Ole-02 I 4.67e-01 I 2.58e+00 1 1 I I 137mga I 1.99et00 I 4.07e-03 I 9.55e-03 I 4.42e-01 I 2.45e+00 11 1) "Sr 1 3.40e-01 1 6.90e-04 1 1.60e-03 I 7.50e-02 I 4.17e-01 1 1 1 1 90Y I 3.40e-01 I 6.90e-04 I 1.60e-03 I 7.50e-02 I 4.17e-01 1 1 ( 1 6oCo 1 1.33e-04 1 4. It has been assumed that the IX columns undergo an accident in which the enclosing box is completely compromised and one of the columns is broken open. The IX columns are cylinders of Amberlite or Duolite enclosed in a 1/8" steel enclosure. No credit was taken for the enclosure, i.e. the filter medium was assumed to be completely exposed.
Only one cylinder, the worst case cylinder (L3) was analyzed so as to provide a worst case situation which would be an upper bound on any other situation. As a more conservative scenario, the dose calculation of the dose from 0-particles and photons assumes an accident where the entire worst case box (four columns) is completely released. Although the material is not flammable, an engulfing fire was analyzed as well as the non-fire situation.
The methodology is based on the IAEA 9-system (Reference 4) outlined in Reference 3 and then amended (Reference 12). The IAEA 0-system was developed as an all-encompassing generalized methodology using only the isotope as the defining variable. considered. Some of the pathways for dose may be considered as not credible and, although these pathways may be covered in the IAEA guide, they are disregarded in the analysis.
In this document, the specifics of the package are 4.5.2 RESULTS
Photon Dose
In the chosen scenario the source i s modeled as a point source. taken for any self-shielding by the source. The entire contents of one of the boxes is assumed to be completely released from its steel enclosure. While only one column has been assumed to be compromised, the onsite receptor is exposed to photons from the other undamaged cylinders also. Although the steel enclosures of these cylinders will decrease this exposure, no credit was taken for this diminution of the dose.
Following the assumptions of Reference 4 it was assumed that the worker stood one meter from the accident for one half of an hour. In the fire scenario the conditions remain the same, despite the fact that the conflagration would tend to strongly discourage a worker from standing within one meter of the source for this amount of time.
No credit is
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The computer code ISOSHLD (References 5 , 6 , and 7) was used t o c a l c u l a t e t h e dose r a t e one meter from t h e source. emitting radionuclides was accounted f o r . f a c t o r s used i n t h e c a l c u l a t i o n were t h e anterior-to-posterior i r r a d i a t i o n p a t t e r n a s presented i n Reference 8. 4.0 x Sv (4.0 x 10.' rem).
O-Particle Dose
The IAEA methodology (Reference 4) assumes a point source of t h e material f o r t h i s case a l s o . As with the photon a n a l y s i s , i t has been assumed i n t h i s case t h a t an e n t i r e box i s completely released. The worst case box i s box 1, containing IX columns L1, L3, R1, and R2. Due t o the limited range of Bp a r t i c l e s a s compared t o photons, a shielding f a c t o r due t o residual shielding from material such a s package d e b r i s i s used by t h e IAEA and i s a l s o adopted here. The v a r i a t i o n of shielding f a c t o r as a function of t h e maximum energy of t h e B-particle i s graphed in Reference 4. Except f o r t h i s f a c t o r no e f f o r t i s made t o account f o r e i t h e r s e l f shielding o r shielding from an accurate model of t h e damaged package. A one half hour s t a y time i s again assumed.
The two graphs in Reference 4 have been incorporated i n t o a spreadsheet in order t o f a c i l i t a t e t h e c a l c u l a t i o n a l process. The t o t a l B-ray dose was c a l c u l a t e d as 4.4 x Of course, t h i s i s a skin dose which, by i t s e l f i s counted a s an organ dose, and when being included in t h e EDE i s multiplied by t h e t i s s u e weighting f a c t o r f o r skin ( 0 . 0 1 ) . As expected, t h e majority of t h e P r a y dose was due t o 'OY.
Airborne Inhalation Dose
The computer code GXQ (Reference 9) was used t o c a l c u l a t e the Y/QS f o r t h e d i s t a n c e s and d i r e c t i o n s f o r t h e nearest s i t e boundary. The meteorological d a t a used were t h e 1983 t o 1991 averages f o r ground ( a c t u a l l y 10m) r e l e a s e s i n t h e 200 and 300 a r e a s . For t h e o n s i t e receptor a constant d i s t a n c e between t h e r e l e a s e point and t h e receptor of 100 m was used. Since t h e 309 building i s not a public exclusion a r e a , t h e distance from the r e l e a s e t o t h e receptor was a l s o assumed t o be 100 m. A value f o r Y / Q was chosen which was not exceeded more than 0.5% of t h e time using t h e NRC methodology.
The worst case of these was t h e n chosen f o r each receptor and used in t h i s a n a l y s i s . Since i t has been assumed t h a t an accident would lead t o t h e confiscation of any foodstuffs found t o be contaminated, ingestion by t h e public was not considered. The worst case f o r both cases was 100 m t o t h e north of t h e r e l e a s e in t h e 300 area. The Y/Q value used was 4.21 x 10.' sec/m'.
Bremsstrahlung from t h e B-particle
The fluence-to-dose conversidn The receptor i s expected t o receive Sv (4.4 x 10" rem).
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The analysis assumes that 100% of the inventory of the worst case column (L3) will be released in the accident. What fraction of this term is suspended in the air in respirable particles is quite a problem. Mishima's review of the published data (Reference 11) was used as the source o f these data. For the non-fire case the value in Mishima for the free-fall drop of an enclosed HEPA filter onto a hard unyielding surface was chosen.
While these filters are not HEPA filters, it was felt that this value would be a bounding value which would not be exceeded in this case. In a HEPA filter the contamination is deposited on the surface of the filter medium, while for an ion exchange filter medium the contamination is adsorbed onto the medium. The release shou2d not exceed that of a HEPA filter. Mishima gives an upper bound of 5 x 10-for the airborne release fraction IARF). and 1.0 for the In respirable fraction (RF,,).
(RARF) would be 5 x 10-.
Thus the respirable airbdrne 'release fraction
Mishima has also reviewed burning of ion exchange resins. These columns use a clay medium rather than a resin, however these data were used for the present situation. Only three experiments were performed yielding a set so restricted that a medium value and spread are not meaningful concepts. However, Hanford has made a practice of chogsing the upper bound, which in this case is ARF = 7.8 x and RF = 9 x 10-, yielding a RARF of 7.0 x This is the value that was used in this analysis.
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Gaseous Vapor Dose
This term is due to submersion in a cloud of gaseous isotopes which do not become incorporated into the body. the package is assumed. The description of this pathway in the IAEA guide concentrates entirely on releases within confining structures. No guidance is given for outside releases. package considered in this document has nonexistent or negligible concentrations of these gases, the problem is moot.
This route for this particular package is not significant as there are no gaseous isotopes trapped in the material and the production rate is trivial.
Neutron Dose
The amount of TRU material is so low that neutron emissions are not of concern in this shipment. neutrons from the (o,n) reaction were considered and dismissed as negligible.
Speci a1 Considerations
A rapid 100% release of the contents of However, since it has been assumed that the In addition to spontaneous and induced fission neutrons, Alpha particle emitters are not of significance in the material considered in this document, neither are tritium nor radon. of a low concentration and their effect will be through the mechanism of inhalation and ingestion. These effects have been considered separately. Bremsstrahlung has been included in the consideration of photon effects and the effects of short lived daughter products have been included in all of the calculations. in equilibrium with their longer lived parent isotopes.
The alpha particle emitters are Where these isotopes were significant they were assumed t o be The r e s u l t s o f these analyses, although r e p o r t e d w i t h two s i g n i f i c a n t f i g u r e s , can o n l y be t r u s t e d t o one. For t h i s reason, t h e h i g h e s t o f t h e doses are g e n e r a l l y chosen except when two o r more dose pathways y i e l d comparable r e s u l t s , i n which case they are added. However, t h e i n h a l a t i o n r e s u l t s are the l i m i t i n g case.
Conclusions
No conclusions can be drawn from t h i s a n a l y s i s . packages used i n s h i p p i n g are v a r i a b l e depending on t h e expected frequency o f t h e a c c i d e n t under c o n s i d e r a t i o n . l i m i t s i s l e f t t o t h e customer.
The a l l o w a b l e l i m i t s on RPT-001, Rev. 0 , dated December 1993. 5 ) 
The d e t e r m i n a t i o n o f c o n f o r m i t y t o t h e
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